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America the Eusocial

TIMOTHY P. O’NEILL*

C

onsider the fern. A fern is composed of individual fronds. Each
frond is composed of smaller, more intricate designs. What is
fascinating is that on whatever scale you view it—a part of a frond,
an entire frond, or a fern as a whole—the design is identical. Thus, a small
part of the figure when enlarged reproduces the original figure; the figure
of the fern is created by repeating the same pattern at smaller and smaller
scales. In other words, the part contains the whole.1
The relative complexity of the fern is thus the same regardless of scale.
An object with this quality is referred to as being “scale insensitive.”2 The
French-American mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot first described this
concept.3 Mandelbrot had expanded on the work of Lewis Richardson, a
mathematician who had discovered problems in trying to measure the
coastline of England.4 If you view the coastline from an orbiting satellite, it
would generally appear jagged, but you would see some stretches that
appear smooth. With a view from an altitude of 5,000 meters, however, you
would find that the smooth parts are actually mostly jagged, with some
smooth parts. You would obtain the same results at successive levels of
magnification—that is, a photo taken from ten centimeters above the

* Edward T. and Noble W. Lee Chair in Constitutional Law, Professor, The John Marshall
Law School. Juris Doctor, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., Harvard University.
1 See MICHAEL BARNSLEY, FRACTALS EVERYWHERE (1988), available at www.popmath.org.uk/
rpamaths/rpampages/fern.html (showing a picture and description of a fractal fern); THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (displaying an early depiction of this art on the front cover). The
giant Leviathan appears to be garbed in a suit of armor; on closer inspection, you can see that
his arms and torso are composed entirely of small people combined to create the giant
Leviathan. See A MIR A LEXANDER, INFINITESIMAL: HOW A DANGEROUS MATHEMATICAL THEORY
SHAPED THE MODERN WORLD 208 (2014).
2 Andrew Morrison Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 649, 655 (2013).
3

See generally BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE (1977)
(introducing the term “fractal”).
4 NIGEL LESMOIR-G ORDON, WILL R OOD & RALPH EDNEY, I NTRODUCING FRACTALS : A
GRAPHIC GUIDE 32–37 (2009).
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coastline will reveal the same relative degree of jaggedness and
smoothness as a picture taken from outer space.5 Mandelbrot described this
phenomenon as a “fractal”: “[A] geometric shape that can be separated into
parts, each of which is a reduced-scale version of the whole.”6
Can we find similar patterns in human behavior and organization?
Michael Shermer, in his recent book The Believing Brain, has thrown some
cold water on the human ability to find patterns.7 He contends that human
beings are adept at finding “patterns” where none exist—such as seeing
pictures in clouds. For this reason, he refers to the human brain as a “belief
engine” and warns against finding correlations that are completely
illusory.8
Nonetheless, two recent books on very different subjects suggest an
underlying similarity that is the subject of this Article. Political
commentator E.J. Dionne, in Our Divided Political Heart, examines what he
views as the paradox that exists at the core of the American experiment. He
states: “American history is defined by an irrepressible and ongoing
tension between two core values: our love of individualism and our
reverence for community. These values do not simply face off against each
other. . . . Rather, both of these values animate the consciousness and
consciences of nearly all Americans.”9 He later continues: “[O]ne of our
country’s peculiar achievements has been to nurture communitarian
individualists—and individualistic communitarians.”10
On the other hand, world-renowned Harvard biologist Edward O.
Wilson recently addressed what he perceives as a paradox in the
development of the most successful groups of insects and animals on Earth
during the last 4.54 billion years. According to Wilson in The Social Conquest
of Earth:
[A]n iron rule exists in genetic social evolution. It is that selfish
individuals beat altruistic individuals, while groups of altruists
beat groups of selfish individuals. The victory can never be
complete; the balance of selection pressures cannot move to
either extreme. If individual selection were to dominate, societies

5

Stumpff, supra note 2, at 654–55.

6

Benoit B. Mandelbrot, A Multifractal Walk Down Wall Street, SCI. AM., 1999, at 70, reprinted
in Benoit B. Mandelbrot, How Fractals Can Explain What’s Wrong with Wall Street, SCI. AM.
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/multifractals-explain-wall-street/.
7

MICHAEL SHERMER, THE BELIEVING BRAIN: FROM GHOSTS AND GODS TO POLITICS AND
CONSPIRACIES—HOW WE CONSTRUCT BELIEFS AND REINFORCE THEM AS TRUTHS 60 (2011).
8

Id. at 59–62.

9

E.J. DIONNE, OUR DIVIDED POLITICAL HEART: THE BATTLE FOR THE A MERICAN IDEA IN AN
AGE OF DISCONTENT 4 (2012).
10

Id. at 69.
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would dissolve. If group selection were to dominate, human
groups would come to resemble ant colonies.11

These two books combine to make an intriguing suggestion. Perhaps
the individualist/communitarian tension Dionne sees as propelling the
American experience bears a relation to what Wilson sees as the driving
force behind the life forms that have been most successful in propagating
this planet.
Perhaps the American experience is a fractal of what has been the
general experience in the history of life on this planet.
I.

America’s “Individualistic Communitarians” and “Communitarian
Individualists”

The core of Dionne’s thesis is that there is no single national trait or
idea that describes America. Instead, American history is defined by the
tension between “our love of individualism and our reverence for
community.”12 But these are not values that are squarely opposed to each
other. Rather, these two values impel Americans to “face not a choice but a
quest for balance.”13 His book shows that for most of American history this
balance has been roughly in place, but Dionne’s concern is that we are in
danger of losing this equilibrium.
Dionne considers it one of America’s peculiar achievements to nurture
“communitarian individualists—and individualistic communitarians.”14
Alexis de Tocqueville expressed this duality in the American character by
noting that Americans “almost always manage to combine their own
advantage with that of their fellow citizens.”15 Bill Clinton described it by
comparing the two sides of the penny. One side has the word “Liberty”;
the other side bears the phrase “E pluribus unum.” Clinton would say that
the penny shows what America is all about: not only personal freedom but
also community obligation.16
Not all commentators have agreed. For Louis Hartz in the 1950s,
America’s only authentic political tradition was Lockean individualistic
liberalism.17 Michael Sandel, on the other hand, has emphasized the civicrepublican tradition, which demands that Americans not only have a

11

EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 243 (2012).

12

DIONNE, supra note 9, at 4.

13

Id. at 5.

14

Id. at 69.

15

Id. at 70 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 525 (Henry Reeve
trans., 1900)).
16 Id. at 71 (citing WILLIAM CLINTON, B ETWEEN HOPE AND HISTORY : MEETING AMERICA’S
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 117 (1996)).
17

Id. at 72.
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knowledge of public affairs but “also a sense of belonging, a concern for
the whole, a moral bond with the community.”18
According to Dionne, each view is partially correct. They express the
philosophical dichotomy that “the United States was born with a divided
political heart.”19 This is because the Founders “were seeking a balance
between liberty and community (between liberalism and republicanism).”20
James Kloppenberg characterizes America as exhibiting “the continuous
presence of rights talk and the continuous presence of competing ideals of
the common good.”21 Thus, the American story is one in which “arguments
for freedom and arguments for community have jostled against each
other.”22 To Dionne, “Republican and liberal ideas, communitarian and
individualistic inclinations, all interacted with each other to create a
national character not easily captured in a sound bite.”23
Dionne, therefore, takes exception to the Tea Party’s view of post-New
Deal government as being a departure from traditional American values of
laissez-faire individualism. On the contrary, he argues that we have a longstanding American tradition of balancing community and individualism
through creating a balance between government and the private sphere. He
argues that at the heart of what he calls “the American idea”—a tradition
that leads back from both the Roosevelts, to Lincoln, to Clay and Jackson,
and even to Hamilton and Jefferson—is a belief that “in a democracy,
government is not the realm of ‘them’ but of ‘us.’”24 Realistically, the
government’s intervention in American life not only pre-dates the New
Deal, but goes back to America’s founding.
For example, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 27 clearly outlined
an active role for the new federal government: “[T]he more the operations
of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of
government . . . the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the
respect and attachment of the community.”25 Everyone did not agree. His
proposal to create a national bank drew the sharp opposition of both
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. George Washington nonetheless
signed the bank bill into law.26 Another example is Hamilton’s famous
Report on Manufactures that proposed to turn America into an industrial

18 DIONNE, supra note 9, at 73 (citing MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 5 (1996)).
19

Id. at 74.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id. (citing JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, THE VIRTUES OF LIBERALISM 200 (1998)).

23

Id. at 80.

24

DIONNE, supra note 9, at 6 (emphasis in original).

25

Id. at 168 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton)).

26

Id. at 170–71.
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nation. To accomplish this, he contended that the “aid of . . . .
[G]overnment [is] indispensable” to fledgling American businesses.27 Thus,
Hamilton proposed that the federal government provide protective tariffs,
bounties, premiums, and awards to business.
Dionne sees Henry Clay and the Whigs as carrying on this
Hamiltonian tradition during the first half of the nineteenth century. Clay’s
vision for the country was named the “American System.” It rejected a
number of fundamentals of the free market economic system:
It believed that a youthful economy, like the American, required
the fostering hand of government; it believed a republican
government responsive to the interests of the people ought to
promote employment, productivity, and wealth; it believed that
national government, in particular, should assume a positive role
in opening up promising lines of economic growth in advance of
market forces.28

Therefore, the American System supported federally-funded “internal
improvements,” such as canals and roads to promote national commerce. It
supported a protective tariff. It supported a strong Bank of the United
States.
But just as Hamilton was opposed by Jefferson, Clay was likewise
opposed by Andrew Jackson. Each of these conflicts is an example of the
individualist/communitarian tension in American politics. The Jacksonian
Democrats, like the Jeffersonian Democrats, wanted to curb federal power.
One historian uses Isaiah Berlin’s terminology to distinguish these two
positions. Clay’s Whigs were advocates of a government’s granting
“positive liberty,” that is, taking proactive steps to enable individuals to
develop themselves. The Jacksonian Democrats, on the other hand,
supported a program of “negative liberty,” in which the federal
government simply left individuals alone to pursue their own ends.29
In terms of electoral success, the Democrats clearly bested the Whigs;
there is a reason Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s book is called The Age of Jackson
rather than The Age of Clay.30 But Dionne quotes Daniel Walker Howe’s
assessment that the Whigs helped transform America from “a collection of
parochial agricultural communities into a cosmopolitan nation.” Howe
contends that from a twenty-first century perspective the Whigs were
clearly “the party of America’s future.”31

27

Id. at 172 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791)
(communicated to the House of Representatives)).
28 Id. at 175 (citing M ERRILL D. PETERSON, T HE G REAT T RIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN 69 (1987)).
29

Id. at 182 (citing LEE BENSON, THE CONCEPT OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 102–05 (1961)).

30

See A RTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, J R., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945).

31

DIONNE, supra note 9, at 178 (citing DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD W ROUGHT
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Dionne uses the examples of Hamilton and Clay to dispute the Tea
Party’s claim that America has always been solely defined by laissez-faire
economics and radical individualism. These policies from the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries illustrate that “the lines between the public and
private sectors were neither as clear nor as sharp as they are today.”32
Dionne stresses that he does not believe that “government” is the same
thing as “community.”33 Yet he contends that there is “an essential and in
some ways paradoxical ambiguity about the relationship between
community and government” in America.34 On the one hand,
“[g]overnment has often been challenged by outside groups rooted in
communities and speaking in their name.”35 And yet, “because of the
democratic character of our system, government also regularly serves as
the primary instrument through which the community interest expresses
itself.”36
In other words, a community can change its perception of government;
it can sometimes cease viewing government as “them” and begin seeing it
as “us.” Dionne quotes Abraham Lincoln’s description of the interplay
between community and government: “The legitimate object of
government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to
have done, but cannot do . . . in their separate and individual capacities.”37
For Lincoln, it was a proper role for the federal government to strengthen
communities by providing free land for would-be farmers, by ceding
federal land for state colleges, and by establishing the National Academy of
Sciences.38
So where did the Tea Party get the idea that America has always
embraced laissez-faire economics and rugged individualism? Dionne
concedes these were indeed the values during the three decades that closed
out the nineteenth century. This is the era that championed both Social
Darwinism and the creation of great corporations and trusts. It is the era in
which the United States Supreme Court declared that corporations are
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. It included the
Gilded Age of the 1890s. The era’s values are reflected in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York.39

612 (2007)).
32

Id. at 186.

33

Id. at 5.

34

Id. at 6.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 6–7.

37

DIONNE, supra note 9, at 160–61 (citing JACOB K. JAVITS, ORDER OF BATTLE: A
REPUBLICAN’S CALL TO REASON 93 (1964)).
38

Id. at 161.

39

Id. at 186–87.
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But Dionne complains that the Tea Party conservatives are “trying to
convert a 35-year interlude into the norm for 235 years of American
history.” The reason he views this period as such an anomaly is that
beginning with Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency at the turn of the
twentieth century, America rejected the laissez-faire values of Lochner and
once again returned to the tradition of seeking a balance between
individualism and community.
The 1890s saw the rise and fall of Populism as exemplified by the failed
presidential runs of William Jennings Bryan. Populism was motivated by a
demand that government rein in the excesses of big business in order to aid
farmers and small businesses. But it was perceived as a rural movement
against urban wealth and power, and it ultimately failed to command a
majority.
Yet the beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a
reform movement that was much more urban and middle class: the
Progressives. The Progressives shared the Populist concern that
government needed to exercise effective oversight of the new industrial
economy, and as Richard Hofstadter noted: “After 1900 . . . Populism and
Progressivism merge[d].”40
The Populist-Progressives “brokered an informal settlement in the
battles between the Jeffersonians and the Hamiltonians, the Jacksonians
and the Whigs.”41 On the one hand, they supported a variety of democratic
electoral reforms that empowered people as individuals—initiative,
referendum, recall, and direct election of senators.
Yet the Populist-Progressive era was also obsessed with the creation of
voluntary community organizations. In fact, Robert Putnam noted:
“[A]lmost all of the major civic institutions of the United States today . . .
were formed between 1880 and 1910.”42 This coincided with the PopulistProgressive drive to use government to curtail social evils caused by
unregulated business. Civic organizations were created as a counterweight
to large industrial organizations.
Dionne sees this Populist-Progressive era as creating the foundation for
twentieth century America. In lieu of Henry Luce’s term “The American
Century,” Dionne has named it “The Long Consensus.” Dionne sees an
interaction between the Depression, the New Deal, and World War II that
has shaped American politics for the entire century. He sees the Long
Consensus as having achieved a balance between individualistic and

40 Id. at 215 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER, T HE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR 133
(1955)).
41
42

Id. at 217.

Id. at 221 (citing Robert D. Putnam, The Decline of Civil Society: How Come? So What?,
John L. Marion Lecture at the Canadian Centre for Management Development (Feb. 22, 1996))
(listing organizations).
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communitarian impulses; Dionne describes it as “individual liberty rooted
in a thriving sense of community and mutual obligation.”43 His concern is
that this balance is currently under attack by the radical individualism of
the Tea Party, which he believes is “as close to triumph as it has been at
any point since the Gilded Age.”44
For Dionne, America’s genius has been its capacity to balance
communitarian and individualist drives. America is “a nation of private
striving and public engagement, of rights and responsibilities.”45
II. Eusociality
Dionne seems to see the “individualist/communitarian” tension as
peculiarly American. Yet Edward O. Wilson sees it in a much larger
context. The conflict between individual values and group values exists
everywhere in the natural world. For Wilson, “an iron rule exists in genetic
social evolution. It is that selfish individuals beat altruistic individuals,
while groups of altruists beat groups of selfish individuals.”46
If this is true, the question becomes why selfish individuals who are
“winners” would ever choose to attach themselves to groups. Wilson notes
that species rarely create sophisticated communities. Yet the ones that do
create such communities have dominated the earth.
The most successful animal communities are what Wilson refers to as
“eusocial.”47 Wilson defines eusociality as “the condition of multiple
generations organized into groups by means of an altruistic division of
labor.”48 He calls this “one of the major innovations in the history of life.”49
This is because eusociality created “superorganisms.”50 A superorganism is
“the next level of biological complexity above that of organisms.”51 Wilson
considers it as important as the conquest of land by air-breathing animals
or the development of flight in insects.52

43

DIONNE, supra note 9, at 242.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 251.

46

WILSON, supra note 11.

47

The term was originally created by Suzanne Batra in 1966. James T. Costa & Terrence D.
Fitzgerald, Social Terminology Revisted: Where Are We Ten Years Later?, 42 ANNALES ZOOLOGICI
FENNICI 559, 559 (2005), available at http://www.sekj.org/PDF/anzf42/anzf42-559.pdf. Its
meaning from Greek is “good social condition.” Wilson has expanded on the term, defining it
as “true social condition.” WILSON, supra note 11, at 109.
48

WILSON, supra note 11, at 133.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.
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Eusocial societies are comprised of multiple generations. They divide
labor in what appears to be an altruistic way. Some may shorten their own
life or refrain from reproduction in order for other members of the group to
live longer and increase their reproduction.53
Yet eusociality presents a paradox: species that have adopted it have
come to dominate the earth, but at the same time eusociality rarely occurs.
For example, eusocial insects—ants, termites, many species of bees and
wasps—constitute only about 3% of the known species of animals on earth.
However, in most places they constitute upwards of 50% of the biomass.54
Wilson observes: “[E]usocial insects are the little things that run the
terrestrial world.”55 As for larger animals, humans are one of the few that
are eusocial.
The point at which a species can become eusocial involves the nest.
Wilson notes the example of a solitary wasp that builds a nest and raises
her young. In the normal scheme of things, the individual offspring will
eventually leave to breed and build their own nests. But if at least some of
the offspring stay at the nest, that group has at least reached the beginning
of eusociality. That is because no group has ever reached eusociality
without first creating a nest guarded by workers and within range of a
reliable food source.56 A second characteristic Wilson believes is probably
universal among eusocial animals is a plan for protection against enemies.57
At this point, mutations may perhaps occur that will foster behavior that
will aid the group, such as alerting systems and ways of helping nestmates
find food.
But Wilson is adamant that the idea that there is a “genetic code
prescribing social behavior of modern humans” is nothing more than a
“chimera.”58 Rather, alleles (i.e. various forms of each gene) that favor the
advantage of the individual “are always in conflict with alleles of the same
and alleles of other genes favoring altruism.”59 Rather than a natural
proclivity towards social behavior, Wilson contends that “there is an
inherent and irremediable conflict in human societies between natural
selection at the individual level and natural selection at the group level.”60
This is not an equal fight. Wilson argues that natural selection at the

53

Id. at 109.

54

Carl Zimmer, What Does E.O. Wilson Mean by a “Social Conquest of the Earth,”
SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-does-eowilson-mean-by-a-social-conquest-of-the-earth-162888428/.
55

WILSON, supra note 11, at 111.

56

Id. at 148–49.

57

Id. at 148.

58

Id. at 54.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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individual level has been so predominant for so much of human history
that it takes an extremely powerful dose of group selection tendencies to
counteract it. That is why eusociality is so rarely found.61 But its rarity does
not detract from the fact that those groups that achieve eusociality are the
most successful on earth.
III. Eusociality and America’s Divided Political Heart
I am not a scientist, and I would not presume to settle the scientific
debates concerning whether Wilson’s science is completely sound.62 I am,
however, interested in how his theory of the tension between the
individual and the group in evolutionary theory intersects with Dionne’s
theory of the tension between the individual and the group in American
history.
For Wilson, “the human condition is an endemic turmoil rooted in the
evolution processes that created us.”63 The turmoil is created by “multilevel
selection, in which individual selection and group selection act together on
the same individual but largely in opposition to each other.”64 “Individual
selection is the result of competition for survival and reproduction among
members of the same group.”65 Group selection, on the other hand, “shapes
instincts that tend to make individuals altruistic toward one another” in
the same group.66 Wilson describes this as “the human dilemma [that] was
foreordained in the way our species evolved, and therefore an
unchangeable part of human nature.”67
At this point, Wilson passes the baton to theorists such as Dionne. This
is because “[h]ow to think out and deal with the eternal ferment generated
by multilevel selection is the role of the social sciences and humanities.”68
Obviously, the individual/group dilemma has very different meanings for

61

WILSON, supra note 11, at 55.

62

In an article about The Social Conquest of Earth, the New York Times reported that the book
had “prompted sharp criticism from his fellow scientists.” His critics were “mystified and
dismayed” by his rejection of “kin selection” that he had championed in his 1975 awardwinning book Sociobiology. Kin selection contends that “evolution favors the genes of
individuals who sacrifice themselves for the sake of relatives.” As discussed in this Article,
Wilson now supports “group selection.” This theory holds that the “tendency of evolution [is]
to favor groups that work together altruistically, beyond what might be predicted by simple
genetic relatedness.” The article describes group selection as “a highly controversial notion
among biologists.” Jennifer Schuessler, Lessons from Ants to Grasp Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2012, at C1, available at 2012 WLNR 7459325.
63

WILSON, supra note 11, at 56.

64

Id. at 241.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 242.
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Dionne and Wilson. Wilson is writing about how this tension is worked
out for survival and reproduction in a society. Dionne, on the other hand,
is looking at how this tension plays out at higher levels of human
organization. But when viewed through Wilson’s lens, Dionne has not
highlighted a peculiarly American dilemma as much as he has focused on
an aspect of a fundamental human tension.
And yet, Dionne may be correct in seeing that this tension has had
particular resonance in American history. This is because at the founding
of the country, individuals—or, more properly, individual white male
property-holders—held a place in this country that was quite different
from the positions of comparable individuals in European societies in the
eighteenth century.
Dionne several times cites Gordon Wood for the proposition that the
American Revolution was “as radical and as revolutionary as any in
history.”69 According to Dionne, Wood asserts that the American
Revolution “overthrew old hierarchies and created a far more egalitarian
and democratic society.”70
Wood reminds us why the idea that “all men [are] created equal” was
so extraordinary for its time.71 He notes that in the eighteenth century the
difference between the aristocracy and “ordinary folk” is almost impossible
for us to comprehend from a twenty-first century perspective.72 They were
not two classes of people; rather, they were “two orders of being.”73
Consider, for example, how the first three American presidents referred to
“ordinary folk.” George Washington called average farmers “the grazing
multitude.”74 John Adams referred to them as the “common Herd of
Mankind.”75 Even Thomas Jefferson said that the common people most
often seen by travelers were “the hackneyed rascals” who “must never be
considered when we calculate the national character.”76
Unlike feudal societies, the American republic was not created “topdown.” Nor does the Constitution even begin with “We the States.” Rather,
it is established by “We the People,” language that could not be more
“bottom-up” in nature. The fact that it was a republic is crucial. As Wood
notes, monarchies assumed a very different group of citizens: “Monarchies
could tolerate great degrees of self-interestedness, private gratification, and

69 DIONNE, supra note 9, at 80 (citing GORDON S. W OOD, RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 5 (1991)).
70

Id.

71

WOOD, supra note 69, at 27.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 28.
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corruption among their subjects.”77 But in a republic, “each man must
somehow be persuaded to sacrifice his personal desires, his luxuries, for
the sake of the public good.”78 The new American republic may have given
“ordinary folk” new-found dignity. But with dignity came responsibility. It
was not a cliché when Benjamin Franklin, as he was leaving Independence
Hall on the final day of the Constitutional Convention, was said to have
responded thusly to the question “Well, Doctor, what have we got—a
Republic or a Monarchy?”: “A Republic, if you can keep it.”79 Republics
require work from their citizens. Republics require “public virtue,” which
Wood defines as “the sacrifice of private desires and interests for the public
interest.”80
A recent academic debate highlights how this tension between
personal freedom and the role of government literally can be traced back to
the Declaration of Independence.
The first two clauses of the Declaration can be labeled a “rights clause”
and a “government clause.” The “rights clause” provides that “all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness.”81 The next clause provides: “That to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from
the Consent of the Governed.”82
The new controversy concerns what is the proper relation between
these two clauses. Danielle Allen, a professor at the Institute for Advanced
Study, found a discrepancy among various versions of the Declaration.83
She noted that the official transcript of the Declaration produced by the
National Archives includes a period after the first clause, thus suggesting
that the two clauses are discrete ideas. But Allen noted that a period does
not appear in a number of other significant versions of the Declaration,
including Thomas Jefferson’s so-called original rough draft in the Library
of Congress and even the version that was entered into Congress’s official
records. Allen also noted that the period does appear in other versions,
including the broadside that Congress commissioned in January 1777 for
distribution to the states. Unfortunately, the parchment copy displayed at
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the National Archives has now faded almost to the point of illegibility, so it
cannot resolve the controversy.84
Jack Rakove finds this dispute significant because it affects an
important issue concerning American values: “Are the parts [of the
Declaration] about the importance of government part of one cumulative
argument, or—as Americans have tended to read the document—
subordinate to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’?”85 Or in Dionne’s
terms, do these values exist not as a “choice,” but rather as a “quest for
balance”?86
Trying to answer this question brings us full circle to the possible
impact of Edward O. Wilson’s work in understanding American society.
IV. Conclusion
Can Wilson’s ideas help us understand the organization of American
society and government? Does Wilson’s work help support Dionne’s
insights? Or would Michael Shermer contend this is merely seeking
“patterns where none exist”?87
Margaret J. Wheatley, a writer who analyzes business organizations,
has noted that:
One of the principles that guides scientific inquiry is that at all
levels, nature seems to resemble itself . . . . If nature uses certain
principles to create her infinite diversity and her well-organized
systems, it is highly probable that those principles apply to
human life and organizations as well. There is no reason to think
that we’d be the exception.88

We variously describe America as traditionally “democratic,”
“republican,” or “civic republican.” At the very least, we might consider
adding “eusocial.”
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